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Abstract
Relative age effects (RAEs) occur when those who are relatively older for their age group are more likely to succeed. RAEs
occur reliably in some educational and athletic contexts, yet the causal mechanisms remain unclear. Here we provide the
first direct test of one mechanism, selection bias, which can be defined as evaluators granting fewer opportunities to
relatively younger individuals than is warranted by their latent ability. Because RAEs are well-established in hockey, we
analyzed National Hockey League (NHL) drafts from 1980 to 2006. Compared to those born in the first quarter (i.e., January–
March), those born in the third and fourth quarters were drafted more than 40 slots later than their productivity warranted,
and they were roughly twice as likely to reach career benchmarks, such as 400 games played or 200 points scored. This
selection bias in drafting did not decrease over time, apparently continues to occur, and reduces the playing opportunities
of relatively younger players. This bias is remarkable because it is exhibited by professional decision makers evaluating
adults in a context where RAEs have been widely publicized. Thus, selection bias based on relative age may be pervasive.
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Introduction
Relative age effects (RAEs) occur when those who are relatively
older for their age group are more likely to succeed. RAEs are
perhaps most often associated with Canadian ice hockey, where
nearly 40% of players on elite junior teams are born in the first
quarter of the year, meaning that, because of a January 1 cut-off
date, they would have been consistently older than their age group
peers [1–5]. RAEs have been described in numerous athletic and
educational contexts, and there is consensus that RAEs are unfair
to relatively younger individuals and that the implied loss of talent
may negatively impact societies [6–14] (but see [15,16]).
Eliminating RAEs has proven challenging, however, in part
because of difficulties in identifying which of the plausible
mechanisms are causal [7,10,11,13,17]. For example, all else
being equal, the youngest boy on a youth hockey team will be
smaller, weaker, less emotionally mature, and less skillful; these
disadvantages may lead to other ones, including diminished
confidence, less instruction from coaches, reduced likelihood of
being selected for elite teams, and, ultimately, a greater likelihood
of dropping out of the sport. Thus, there are many potentially
causal mechanisms, and they are likely to interact.
Here, we attempt to isolate and demonstrate the occurrence of
one mechanism: selection bias. By selection bias, we mean that
evaluators (e.g., teachers, coaches) mistakenly grant fewer oppor-
tunities (e.g., instruction, access to elite group or team) to relatively
younger individuals than is warranted by their latent ability or
talent. Although selection bias is widely accepted as a contributor
to RAEs [7,10,11,13,17], there is little direct evidence for it (but
see [10,11]), apparently owing to the difficulty of obtaining
measures of both perceived and latent talent. Furthermore, in
most studies consistent with selection bias, the selector’s preference
for relatively older individuals might be rational, given the
selector’s aims and the greater maturity of relatively older
individuals. For example, a coach selecting a youth team may
favor relatively older players because the coach’s performance may
be evaluated based on her team’s success; similarly, a teacher may
select mostly relatively older pupils for a gifted academic program
because they are most likely to benefit from and contribute to it.
We tested the hypothesis of selection bias by evaluating entry
drafts of the National Hockey League (NHL), the world’s premier
professional ice hockey league. NHL teams generally draft players
once they have reached 18 years of age [18], and teams select
players in order of their perceived talent [19,20]. Nevertheless,
there is uncertainty regarding the career trajectory of players, and
nearly half never develop sufficiently to play a single game in the
NHL. The logic of our study is that a player’s draft slot serves as a
measure of their perceived talent whereas career productivity
indicates their realized talent. If selection bias occurs, then, for any
given draft slot, relatively younger players will enjoy more
productive careers.
The possibility of selection bias in NHL drafting was suggested
by a recent study [3]. It reported that 40% of Canadian-born first
round NHL draft selections from 2007–2010 (n= 62) were born in
the first quarter, but only 28% of Canadian-born NHL players
were born in the first quarter. Moreover, in a large sample
(n = 1,003), first quarter born players comprised fewer than 25% of
Canadian All-Star and Olympic team members and had
substantially shorter NHL careers than players born later in the
year.
We expanded on this study in several ways. First, our analyses of
productivity included all selections from all draft rounds for a
period of 27 years, meaning that our sample size of draftees was 44
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times larger (n = 2,736 Canadian-born non-goaltenders). Second,
we used analytic methods to directly test for selection bias while
controlling for potentially confounding variables. Most crucially,
we tested whether birth quarter was associated with productivity
once draft slot was controlled; this is vital because relatively
younger players may be drafted earlier [21]. Third, we investi-
gated a potential mediator of selection bias, the decision to become
draft eligible. Fourth, we tested for changes in selection bias over
time. Finally, we examined whether selection bias reduces
relatively younger individuals’ playing opportunities.
Results
We began by confirming previous studies showing that the
number of players drafted differed by birth quarter [3,21].
Overall, 36% of draftees came from the first quarter and 14.5%
came from the fourth quarter. As shown in Figure 1, this
discrepancy occurred in every draft from 1980 to 2012, and there
was no indication of temporal change for the percentage of fourth
quarter players drafted, the percentage of first quarter players
drafted or their difference (all ps..45).
Productivity measures
In assessing NHL productivity and selection bias (i.e., all
analyses below), we only considered players drafted prior to 2007
because little data have accrued for players drafted later than this.
As our primary productivity measure, we used career games
played [3,19,22,23] (see also [24,25]). The logic is that if a team
decides to utilize a player, they must view him as likely to
contribute more than their alternatives. Games played is
advantageous because it accommodates various positions and
roles (e.g., defenseman, enforcer, scorer, checking forward).
Furthermore, supporting its validity, games played correlated with
three other prima facie indicators of productivity, goals per game
(r(1459) = 0.46, p,.0001), assists per game (r(1459) = 0.57,
p,.0001), and points (i.e., goals plus assists) per game
(r(1459) = 0.57, p,.0001)(see [22]). Games played also correlated
with a productivity measure that encompasses offensive and
defensive contributions, plus-minus per game (r(1459) = 0.23,
p,.0001); plus-minus is goals scored by own team while playing
less goals scored against own team while playing. For both
defensemen and forwards, games played correlated with all four
measures of productivity (all ps,.0001). As a secondary produc-
tivity measure we used career points scored.
Selection bias
Supporting the hypothesis of selection bias, the percentage of
total productivity achieved by players born in the third and fourth
quarters was far greater than the percentage of players drafted
from these quarters (Fig. 2). For example, although 14.5% of
draftees were born in the fourth quarter, these individuals played
20% of the games (477,000) and scored 19% of the points
(209,000) accumulated by draftees in our sample. By contrast,
those born in the first quarter dramatically under-produced, given
that they constituted 36% of draftees.
That relatively younger players are relatively more productive
(Fig. 2) is consistent with the selection bias hypothesis but does not
unambiguously support it. The reason is that players drafted
earlier are expected to be more productive, and relatively younger
players might be drafted earlier. This pattern was reported
previously [21], and we also found it here with a larger sample
(ordinary least squares regression: R2= .01, F(3,2732) = 9.29;
p,.0001; mean draft slot Q1= 119; Q2= 114; Q3= 124;
Q4=99). The critical question, therefore, is whether birth quarter
is related to productivity when draft slot is controlled.
We addressed this question using Tobit regressions to account
for players who never reached the NHL. Indicator variables were
included to estimate the effect of later birth quarters (i.e., second,
third, fourth) compared to the first quarter, and these models also
controlled for draft slot, position (i.e., defenseman, forward),
height, and year of draft. The results indicated that, compared to
first quarter draftees, relatively younger draftees played more
games (Q2= 71 games, p= .005; Q3= 160, p,.001; Q4= 162;
p,.001) and scored more points (Q2= 52 points, p = .002;
Q3=110, p,.001; Q4=88; p,.001).
A key question is whether selection bias applies even to early
draft selections, where decisions are weighed more carefully [19].
We thus repeated these regression analyses restricting our analyses
to players selected in the first 30 slots. This currently corresponds
to the first round of the NHL draft (i.e., each team makes their first
selection), although it represented almost 1.5 rounds at the
beginning of our study period when there were 21 teams. The
magnitude of selection bias was similar to when we included all
draftees (above), although owing to small samples, the coefficient
estimates were not always significant (games: Q2= 80, p = .11;
Q3=223, p,.001; Q4= 92, p = .09; points: Q2= 69, p = .08;
Q3=162, p,.001; Q4=45, p= .30).
The magnitude of selection bias can be appreciated by
examining the percentage of players from each birth quarter
reaching major career benchmarks [19] (Fig. 3; Table 1). The
differences are striking: across the sample (n = 2,736), 13% of those
born in the first quarter reached 400 games, whereas the values for
Figure 1. Percentage of NHL draftees born in the first or fourth
quarter over time. Blue circles indicate first quarter; yellow triangles
indicate fourth quarter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057753.g001
Figure 2. Percentage of draftees and productivity by relative
age.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057753.g002
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the other quarters were, respectively, 18%, 21%, and 25% (Odds-
ratio [OR] compared to first quarter: 1.47, 1.78, 2.23). Further-
more, the percentages from each quarter reaching 200 points were
8%, 13%, 15%, and 17% (OR: 1.71, 2.02, 2.36). Although
selection bias is also manifest in the basic benchmark of playing at
least one NHL game, the effect was more modest; the percentages
were 48%, 53%, 55%, and 65% (OR: 1.22, 1.32, 2.01). Because
the majority of more highly drafted players (i.e., selected in first
100 slots), reached this benchmark, the effect was driven by players
drafted later (Table 1).
Although relatively younger players (specifically those born in
the fourth quarter) were drafted somewhat earlier than those born
in the first quarter, the regressions controlling for draft slot indicate
that, given their productivity, they were not drafted early enough.
To further illustrate this, we estimated the discrepancy in drafts
slots for a first quarter born player and relatively younger player
who had played the same number of games. As above, the
coefficients on the birth quarter dummy variables (i.e., intercepts)
were all significantly different from the first quarter (all ps,0.01),
and there was no indication that the slopes differed (F(3,
2492) = 0.58, p = .63; all individual slopes ps..20). The regressions
indicated that a second quarter draftee played the same number of
games as a first quarter one if drafted 20 slots later; the
discrepancies for the third and fourth quarters were 45 and 43
slots.
Temporal change
Systematic biases in some professional sports drafts have
diminished over time [24,26].
To test for temporal change in selection bias in the NHL draft,
we used the draft slot discrepancy measures described in the
previous paragraph. Because the effects were large, we focused on
the first and third quarter discrepancy and the first and fourth
quarter discrepancy. Due to the modest sample for each year, we
calculated discrepancies with a five year moving window.
Figure 4 shows that both draft slot discrepancies were in the
predicted direction for all 23 of these five year epochs. Both
discrepancies were significant (p,.05) for 20 of 23 epochs. The
first to third discrepancy did not reach significance at epochs with
midpoints of 1987, 1997, and 1999; the first to fourth discrepancy
was not significant for 1982, 1996, and 1998. Both discrepancies
tended to increase over time, although in neither case was this
change significant (first to third: r(21) = .33, p = .13; first to fourth:
r(21) = .25, p = .26). Thus, we found no indication that selection
bias based on relative age decreased over time.
Decision to become draft eligible
We next considered a potential mediator of selection bias, the
player’s decision to become draft eligible. In particular, prior to
2005 players were not uniformly draft eligible based on their
birthdays and had to inform the NHL office that they wished to
‘opt in’ to the draft [18,27]. Unfortunately, we were unable to
obtain data regarding actual opt in decisions. However, based on
birthdays and year of draft selection, we determined that 70% of
players were drafted in their first year of potential eligibility,
meaning that at least this percentage opted in. Moreover, players
drafted in their first year of eligibility were drafted substantially
Figure 3. Percentage of draftees from each birth quarter
achieving benchmarks of career games played.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057753.g003
Table 1. Percentage of draftees achieving career benchmarks
by relative age and draft slot.
Games Points
Birth quartern 1+ 200+ 400+ 600+ 100+ 200+
Draft slots 1–100
1 444 73 34 22 14 23 13
2 400 74 40 29 20 31 22
3 231 75 48 39 28 40 28
4 225 81 48 37 25 40 26
Total 1300 75 41* 30* 20** 31** 21**
Draft slots 101+
1 541 28 10 6 4 6 3
2 420 34 11 7 4 6 5
3 304 40 12 8 5 7 6
4 171 44 16 9 6 9 6
Total 1436 34* 11 7 4 7 4
All draft slots
1 985 48 21 13 8 14 8
2 820 53 25 18 12 18 13
3 535 55 27 21 15 22 15
4 396 65 34 25 17 27 17
Total 2736 53* 25** 18** 12** 18** 12**
Note. Chi-square tests of independence were used to test if frequency of
achieving benchmark was dependent on birth quarter. * p,.01; ** p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057753.t001
Figure 4. Selection bias against relatively younger draftees
over time. Draft slots indicate the draft selection discrepancy between
individuals born in the first quarter and later quarters with equivalent
career games played. Yellow diamonds indicate first to third quarter
discrepancy; blue circles indicate first to fourth quarter discrepancy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057753.g004
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earlier than those drafted in their second or third year of eligibility
(first mean= 99; later mean=152, t(2734) = 17.5, p,.0001). This
suggests that many players who were not drafted in their first year
of eligibility had previously opted in but had not been drafted due
to their perceived lesser ability. Nonetheless, in the 2005 and 2006
drafts, when all players were automatically eligible, 86% were
drafted in their first year of eligibility whereas only 67% were
drafted in their first year of eligibility in the 2003 and 2004 (opt in)
drafts. This indicates that an appreciable number of players did
not opt in prior to 2005.
To address the opt in decision as a potential mediator, we first
examined whether there is an effect of year of potential draft
eligibility on productivity. We found evidence for such an effect:
players drafted in their second or third year of potential eligibility
were substantially more productive than those drafted in their first
year of potential eligibility; this held in Tobit regressions
controlling for draft slot, position, height, and year of draft
(games = 80, p= .001; points = 55, p = .001).
However, if the opt in decision was truly a mediator, then the
relation between birth quarter and productivity should disappear
or significantly weaken when regressions control for the year of
potential draft eligibility. Contrary to this, birth quarter remained
a strong predictor of productivity when year of potential draft
eligibility was added to the regressions, which also included draft
slot, position, height, and year of draft. This was true for games
(Q2= 69, p= .008; Q3= 158, p,.001; Q4= 165; p,.001) and
points (Q2=49, p = .004; Q3= 108, p,.001; Q4= 91; p,.001).
Crucially, the interactions between birth quarter and year of
potential eligibility (i.e., first, or later) were not significant in any
case (all ps ..10). Furthermore, when we repeated our original
tests of selection bias using only the 70% of players drafted in their
first year of potential eligibility, we still found that players born in
the second, third, and fourth quarters were far more productive
than those born in the first quarter (games: Q2=64, p = .03;
Q3= 139, p,.001; Q4=134; p,.001; points: Q2=47, p = .02;
Q3= 99, p,.001; Q4= 79; p= .001). We found similar results
when we only included the 30% of players drafted in their second
or third year of eligibility (games: Q2=78, p= .10; Q3= 191,
p,.001; Q4= 243; p,.001; points: Q2= 58, p = .08; Q3= 131,
p,.001; Q4= 119; p = .01). Thus, there is no indication that the
opt in decision mediated selection bias based on relative age.
Costs of selection bias
Finally, we explored a potential cost of selection bias, namely
that later draft selections may receive fewer playing opportunities
than their latent talent would warrant. The reason is that when a
player’s ability to make a net contribution to their team is
ambiguous, teams will more often grant the benefit of doubt to a
player to whom they have invested more highly (i.e., drafted
earlier). This tendency is called ‘escalation’ in studies of
professional basketball [28,29].
The hockey data yielded evidence consistent with escalation:
games played was jointly predicted by points per game and draft
slot; crucially the draft slot regression coefficient was negative
(R2= .50, F(2,1456)= 736.8, p,.0001; bdraft slot =2.69, p,.001;
bpoints per game = 7.26, p,.001). Furthermore, when position, height,
and plus-minus per game were added as predictors, the effect of
draft slot remained substantial (R2= .51, F(5,1275)= 262.4,
p,.0001; bdraft slot =2.69, p,.001; bpoints per game = 7.22,
p,.001; bposition-forward =276.1, p,.001; bplus-minus =2.26,
p= .10; bheight =21.9, p= .63). Thus, a player who is drafted ‘later
than they should be,’ must produce more to receive the same
playing opportunities.
Discussion
Here, we have demonstrated that, for 27 years, relatively
younger NHL draftees have enjoyed substantially more productive
careers than would be predicted by their draft slots. Moreover, the
pattern of drafting far fewer relatively younger individuals has not
waned and has occurred again in recent years, including in the
2012 draft (Fig. 1). Before we explore the implications of this
selection bias, we must address three questions.
First, are our findings novel, given earlier studies? It was
previously known that the unequal distribution of players by birth
quarter is greater in junior hockey than in the NHL [2,3,5]. This
pattern is consistent with selection bias but does not require it.
This is because relatively younger players in junior hockey might,
on average, be more talented than relatively older players, and
NHL teams might recognize this and draft accordingly. In fact, a
previous study reported that relatively younger players were
drafted earlier [21], and we confirmed the effect with a larger
sample. Thus, if NHL teams simply drafted based on (unbiased)
perceptions of talent, there would be no relationship between
relative age and productivity. We showed, however, that there is a
strong relationship, even when draft slot is controlled.
Our findings are also novel in that they apparently constitute
the first demonstration that, in sports, selection based on relative
age can be irrational (see below). As noted in the Introduction,
although many studies show that relatively older players are more
likely to be selected for youth elite teams, none of these studies
address whether these selection patterns are disadvantageous for
the teams and selectors given that relatively older players generally
have greater ability at the time of selection. Because we had good
measures of both perceived talent (i.e., draft slot) and realized
talent (i.e., career productivity), we were able to address this
question directly.
A second question is whether there could there be some rational
basis for teams drafting relatively younger individuals later than is
warranted by their career productivity. A study of the Australian
Football League draft illustrates how this might occur: indigenous
players significantly outperformed their draft slots; however, the
authors could not rule out that this selection bias might be rational
because the recruitment and retention of indigenous players might
require additional resources, such as assistance with housing and
cultural acclimatization [25]. Similarly, a study found that South
American players in the Premier division of the English
professional soccer league tended to be overpaid in terms of their
effects on team performance; however, this preference for South
American players might be rational because the presence of these
players, perhaps owing to their stylish play, was associated with
increased attendance [30].
Although an explanation analogous to one of these examples
cannot be logically excluded, it is difficult to conceive of a
reasonable one. For example, most fans are apparently unaware of
players’ birthdays and do not have stereotypical beliefs about the
playing style or abilities of players based on relative age.
Furthermore, as we showed, the selection bias was robust to
different measures of productivity and was undiminished when
possible confounds were incorporated. Perhaps the most plausible
idea is that relatively older individuals are rationally preferred,
despite their worse long-term productivity, because they are more
likely to make an early contribution to a team. In particular, a
relatively older player would be absolutely older than a relatively
younger one, meaning that they would be further along in their
development.
Contrary to such reasoning, however, draft eligibility rules
dictate that players born from January 1 to September 15 of year
Selection Bias in the NHL Draft
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X first potentially become draft-eligible at the same time as players
born September 16 to December 31 of year X-1 [18,19].
Paradoxically, then, relatively older individuals (e.g., born in first
quarter) are absolutely younger than those in their draft-eligible
cohort who were born in the fourth quarter. Furthermore, our
results show that relatively older individuals are not only less likely
to reach long-term career benchmarks (i.e., 400 career games);
they are also less likely to even play a single game (Fig. 3; Table 1).
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the selection bias we have
shown is not in the drafting teams’ best interest (i.e., it is irrational).
A third question is whether there is in fact an RAE in the NHL.
Representation and productivity in the NHL differed substantially
by birth quarter (Fig. 2; Table 1). Nonetheless, one might argue
that because the RAE is smaller in the NHL than in junior leagues
[2,3,5] there is no mechanism actively contributing to the RAE in
the NHL [3] (see also [15,31–33]). In other words, the differential
representation by quarter in the NHL is a legacy of past RAE
mechanisms. Our demonstration that relatively younger draftees
typically achieve greater careers certainly supports this view.
Indeed, one might suggest that ‘the cream rises to the top,’ and,
despite where they are drafted, truly talented players, whether
relatively older or younger, will manage to develop their abilities
and achieve long and productive careers [3,34,35].
This argument has some validity, yet it overlooks that being
drafted ‘later than one should,’ or not being drafted at all, can be
costly. Our analysis of escalation effects shows that, once in the
league, players who are drafted earlier receive greater playing
opportunities than is warranted by their productivity. These
opportunities should allow them to more easily establish their
reputations, and these opportunities can translate directly into
compensation because recently drafted players can earn most of
their income through playing-dependent performance bonuses
[18]. Moreover, prior to the collective bargaining agreement of
1995, rookie salaries were far higher for players drafted earlier
[36]. Indeed, the likely benefits of early selection are revealed in
the behavior of potential draftees: they voluntarily endure days of
draft evaluation sessions (e.g., interviews, physiological testing) to
improve their draft prospects [19]. Thus, if there was no selection
bias against relatively younger individuals, there would be more of
them in the NHL, and they would produce and earn more.
Our demonstration of selection bias against relatively younger
draftees is important because it suggests that selection bias may
occur broadly. Obviously, selecting professional hockey players
differs considerably from selection in other contexts, yet we believe
that, all else being equal, selection bias could be at least as great
elsewhere.
Consider NHL teams’ draftee evaluations compared to German
teachers’ recommendations about their 10 year-old pupils; these
recommendations concerning the suitability of secondary school
tracks (e.g., basic or academic) are substantially biased against
relatively younger children and have life-long effects [11,12].
N NHL teams are evaluating 18 year-olds, not 10 year-olds,
meaning that any age gap is proportionally almost twice as
large [13]. In fact, most discussions of RAEs state or imply
that, although the consequences of RAE mechanisms may
persist into adulthood, most mechanisms will be active in
children or early adolescents [3] (see also [15,31–33]).
N NHL drafting is done by scouts and general managers who are
highly motivated to make accurate evaluations due to the high-
stakes involved and the scrutiny given to their decisions
[19,20,24,26]. By contrast, teachers making recommendations
may have less information, less time for deliberation, and may
face few or no consequences for poor decisions.
N NHL teams are probably aware of RAEs. RAEs in hockey
have been documented in the academic literature since the
mid-1980s [2,4], recognized as potentially important by
national federations since the mid-1990s [5], and popularized
in a bestselling book [37]. In fact, hockey scouts’ evaluations
frequently consider the relative age of the scouted player
compared to their teammates and opponents [19]. Teachers,
on the other hand, may have little or no awareness of RAEs
[8,11].
These points collectively indicate that selection bias may be a
pervasive contributor to RAEs and that merely instructing
selectors to account for it may be ineffective (see [8,11]).
A final question is what factor(s) causes NHL teams to
underestimate the future productivity of relatively younger players.
The obvious candidate is maturity-related differences in physio-
logical (e.g., power) and technical characteristics [38]. This
possibility might seem unlikely because, as noted above, individ-
uals born in the fourth quarter are, in most cases, absolutely older
than others in their draft-eligible cohort [18,19]. However, player
evaluations are based on several years of consideration and, once a
player is initially evaluated by professional scouts, perhaps in their
early teens, this can, in various ways, affect future evaluations. For
instance, relatively younger players may be less likely to be selected
for the most elite junior teams [19,20] (see also [1–5]); level of
competition, has, in turn, been shown to systematically bias
drafting in professional sports [39]. Similarly, prior to 2005,
players’ decisions regarding what year they ‘opted in’ to the draft
might have mediated the selection bias; however, our analyses
found no evidence for this.
Another possibility is that selection bias in NHL drafting is
based on some sort of ‘underdog’ effect whereby relatively younger
individuals, because they have faced greater social challenges
[9,14] (see also [34]), compensate by developing greater adapt-
ability to different roles or better work habits; these traits then lead
to greater long-term achievement [3,32] (see also [40]). An
underdog effect would have interesting implications, but there is
little direct evidence for it yet. Furthermore, even if an underdog
effect occurs, its importance is generally countervailed by other
mechanisms that typically make being relatively younger disad-
vantageous [6–14].
Materials and Methods
We obtained data from the official National Hockey League
web site, www.nhl.com. In cases where data were unavailable, we
attempted to obtain them from another site, www.hockeydb.com/.
We recorded information on draft year, draft slot, player name,
birth country, birth month, birth year, and whether the player was
a goalie, defenseman, or forward (i.e., center, wing). We initially
gathered data on all 8,186 draft selections made from 1980–2012.
We did not consider data prior to 1980 because, before this, RAEs
did not occur consistently [41,42], and birth dates for draftees who
did not reach the NHL were sparse. For analyses involving
productivity, we excluded players drafted from 2007–2012; we did
this because these players have had little opportunity to accrue
production.
The number of selections across our sample varied across years
from 210 to 293. This variation was due to an increase in the
number of NHL teams (from 21 in 1980 to 30 since 2000) and a
decrease in the number of draft rounds (from 12 during the most
drafts in the 1980s to 7 since 2005). In less than 1% of cases, a
player was drafted, did not sign a contract, and then was selected a
second time in a later draft; we excluded players’ data from their
second drafting.
Selection Bias in the NHL Draft
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For several reasons, we excluded those who were not Canadian-
born (55% of draftees). First, draft eligibility rules differ for
individuals playing outside of North America [18]. Second,
European based players often play in their domestic leagues or
have national service obligations; these can raise obstacles to their
playing in the NHL and can affect the willingness of teams to draft
them [19]. Third, because there are far more Canadians than any
other nationality in the NHL and the Canadian developmental
system is comparatively homogenous, most previous RAE studies
focused on Canadian-born players [2–5,41]. We also excluded
goalies. We did this because they constitute a small percentage of
draftees (10%), and the development and evaluation of goalies
differs substantially from that of forwards and defensemen [19,20].
Our preliminary analyses yielded no indication of selection bias for
goalies, using games as the productivity measure (for each later
birth quarter, p..70; combined F-test, p = .95). If we had included
goalies, the selection bias shown in our Results would have been
highly similar (for each later quarter, ps,.01).
Because players have unequal opportunities to participate in the
playoffs, we considered only regular season production. Teams
played 80–84 games per annual regular season during the sample,
with the exception of one abbreviated (1994–1995) and one
cancelled season (2004–2005) [19,36]. Our productivity measures
were based on career totals at the conclusion of the 2011–2012
season. Because many players have not yet completed their
careers, they will continue to accrue productivity. Although this
means that draft year will correlate with productivity, there is no
known reason to expect that this would spuriously produce
evidence of selection bias.
Because roughly 45% of draftees never play in a single NHL
game, productivity measures have a non-normal distribution.
Thus, when predicting productivity, we used censored regression
models (i.e., Tobits). When conducting multiple regressions to
address escalation effects, we reported regression coefficients that
were not standardized, so that the coefficients represent condi-
tional marginal effects. For example, the first set of regression
results indicate that, when draft slot is fixed, games played
increases by 7.24 for each additional point per game scored. All
analyses were conducted using two-tailed statistical tests with Stata
v.12.1 (College Station, TX).
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